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TRANSFER PRICING: UN PRACTICAL MANUAL – CHINA
Richard Ainsworth
Andrew Shact
Any contemporary Chinese transfer pricing assessment needs to consider the
United Nation (UN) Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries1
released in May 2013. In particular, Chapter 10 discusses Country Practices and presents
China’s most up to date transfer pricing policy statement.
A cautionary note is in order. The detailed position in Chapter 10 has not yet
been articulated in a new Circular. Nevertheless, there are risks in ignoring this very
public State Administration of Taxation (SAT)2 statement on this matter.
China is not an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) member nor has it formally adopted the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations3. Chapter 10 makes it very clear
that China is charting a different transfer pricing course in at least nine important areas4.
China believes that:
1. significant comparability adjustments are needed when comparable sets are drawn
from developed countries such as Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand;
2. the transactional net margin (TNMM) is considered overused and inaccurate;
3. location savings must be reflected in the costs included in a cost-plus mark-up for
research and development conducted in China;
1

UN, Department of Economics & Social Affairs, ST/ESA/347 (May 2013) available at:
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf
2
The authors of the China Chapter are: Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director of the International Taxation
Department of the State Administration of Taxation (People’s Republic of China) and Wang Xiaoyue,
Director of Anti-Avoidance Division of the International Taxation Department of the State Administration
of Taxation. Sebastian Gonnett, Location Specific Advantages – China, TRANSFER PRICING
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (October 14, 2011) 261 indicates:
Not all the new principles under the China Chapter of the UN Manual have been put into
practice yet. Perhaps, the purpose of the China Chapter of the UN Manual is to seek
endorsement from the United Nations for the positions it outlines. However, the State
Administration of Taxation has expressed officially that it will incorporate these positions
into law in 2013. And some tax officials are already adopting certain of these positions,
like the market premium, during audits.
3
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995) & (2010) available at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/12/45763692.pdf. Prior to 2009 Chinese regulations listed acceptable
transfer pricing methods without guidance on how to apply them. The general appeal at that time was to
the “international standards” that were referenced, which was understood by most practitioners to provide
the linkage that was wanted to the OECD Guidelines. Circular 2 (in 2009) provided detailed guidance on
acceptable Chinese transfer pricing methods, as well as the factor analysis that needed to be applied in this
analysis. The details in Circular 2 are generally consistent with the OECD Guidelines. This makes the
discussion in the UN Practical Manual a departure from had been assumed to be the Chinese norm.
4
The authors of the China Chapter are: Tizhong Liao, Deputy Director of the International Taxation
Department of the State Administration of Taxation (People’s Republic of China) and Wang Xiaoyue,
Director of Anti-Avoidance Division of the Inter- national Taxation Department of the State Administration
of Taxation.
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4. toll manufacturers will be converted into contract manufacturers with tightened
rules (i.e. adding back cost of materials rejecting return-on-assets analysis);
5. limited risk distributor status is denied for brand building distributors (those that
have significant advertising, marketing, and promotion activities);
6. market premiums must be reflected in Chinese profits;
7. tax haven based intellectual property ownership can be “looked through” or
denied (Art. 94, Circular 2);
8. cost-plus methodology is rejected when a Chinese related party qualifies as an
intangible developer under “high and new technology status” (HNTS);
9. royalty adjustments over time are necessary;
The Chinese approach to transfer pricing or at least the approach presented in the
Practical Manual uses familiar OECD terminology but it places a very different
emphasis on some basic concepts in the OECD Guidelines. Chapter 10’s overall intent is
to shift income back into China in direct contrast to the result under standard OECD
practice.
The Brazilian transfer pricing regime outlined in the Practical Manual can be
compared with the Chinese approach yet the differences between the two regimes are
easy to spot. Brazil stresses the methods’ simplicity, safe harbors, and fixed margins.
The Brazilian5 based resale price method encourages exports and stimulates foreign
direct investment in domestic manufacturing6. The Chinese emphasis is different because
China has a strong export profile and expects the climate for foreign direct investment to
continue to be robust.
Economic projections bear this out on both the demand and the supply side.
Chinese consumption (demand) is expected to be very strong, well into the 21st
century. China’s economy is estimated to become twice as big as that of the
United States and according to a leading Chinese economist larger than both the
United States and the European Union combined by 2030. Other economists are
more guarded, and the consensus is that China’s GDP will be equal to the United
States by 2020 and double the United States by 20507.
The Chinese supply side is also strong, fueled by low cost labor and lower costs
for doing business. For example, Sebastian Gonnett indicates8 that hourly compensation
costs in China averages $2.36/hour compared with $33.53/hour in the US and
$37.46/hour in the EU-15 countries. In fact, India is the only BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China) market with a lower average hourly rate. For example, Brazilian labor
5

The resale price methods are: Preço de revenda menos lucro (PRL) – for imports; Preço de Venda por
Atacado no País de Destino, Diminuído do Lucro (PVA) – for wholesale exports; Preço de Venda a Varejo
no País de Destino, Diminuído do Lucro (PVV) – for retail exports.
6
Richard T. Ainsworth, Transfer Pricing: UN Guidelines – Brazil, TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL
(forthcoming)
7
Shanwu Yuan, Jinghua Liu, & Glenn DeSouza, Changing Transfer Pricing Landscape: “Like It or Not,”
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL (July/August 2013) 259.
8
Sebastian Gonnett, Location Specific Advantages – China, TRANSFER PRICING INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
(October 14, 2011).
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costs are roughly four times higher than Chinese at $8.32/hour9. In addition, even though
measured in hours, the average annual tax compliance cost in China is 398 hours or
roughly twice that in the US at 187 hours and the EU-15 at 170 hours it is quite small in
relation to the Brazilian cost at 2,600 hours10.
Perhaps the most compelling figures come from comparing population and market
size, as measured by the World Economic Forum’s Market Size Index. The Index runs
from 1 to 7 (the higher number indicating the larger market). On the Population &
Market Size Index the US measures 6.9, while China measures 6.7. The US population
(309 million people) is much smaller than the Chinese (2.4 billion people), but their
relative market sizes are similar. This makes the following market observation critical.
The Chinese middle class is expected to expand to 50% of the population in the next two
decades, and this will drive a huge increase in Chinese consumption. China will be at
the top of the Index.
In contrast, the Brazilian population is 197 million and its market size is at 5.6.
Thus, even though Brazil has more market growth potential than China, its population
base is much smaller. This translates into lower overall commercial growth expectations.
China’s growth will be many multiples higher than Brazil’s11.
Thus, the Chinese market economics strengthens the SAT’s hand and encourages
more forceful transfer pricing policies. This is the case even though these policies
diverge from OECD norms. Collectively, China, unlike Brazil is not concerned that
aggressive transfer pricing enforcement will negatively impact its economic growth.
This paper considers the nine major areas where the Chinese position in the UN
Practical Manual differs from positions in the OECD Guidelines. Because the Chinese
section in the Practical Manual is only concerned with the methods used to determine an
arm’s length price and not the related party definition, this paper will only address the
methods12.
9

Id., at Figure 2 (referencing data sources at Bloomberg Law Services and the Conference Board Total
Economy Database).
10
Id., at Table 2 (referencing data from the World Bank).
11
Id., at figure 5 (referencing World Bank and World Economic Forum databases, and Mckinsey, The Bird
of Gold: The Rise of India’s Consumer Market; UN Population Division, Goldman Sachs).
12
All transfer pricing is really about only two issues: (1) are the parties related, and (2) can the arm’s length
price for transactions between these related parties be determine by one or more of certain specified
methods. The Chinese rules on related parties are different from the OECD’s definitions, and they include:
• 25% shares ownership – One party directly or indirectly holds a total of 25 percent or more of
another party’s shares; or a third party holds, directly or indirectly, 25 percent or more of the
shares of both parties. Where an entity owns more than 25 percent of an intermediary entity, its
indirect ownership of the lower tier entity will be deemed to be the same as the intermediary’s
direct ownership of the lower tier entity;
• Debt held – Debts owed by one enterprise to another enterprise (other than an independent
financial institution) reach 50 percent of the enterprise’s capital, or 10 percent
or more of the total debts owed by one enterprise is guaranteed by another enterprise (other than
an independent financial institution);
• Senior management – More than half of one party’s senior management personnel (including the
members of the board of directors and managers), or at least one member of the board of directors
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This discussion is divided into the three themes that are woven throughout the
Chinese contribution to the UN Practical Manual. The themes interlock and encompass
the nine major Chinese/OECD variances. The themes flow into one another and are not
always easy to replicate as stand-alone propositions. Collectively, they are the “difficult
challenges” for which the Chinese believe that “ready answers have not been found in the
OECD Guidelines”13. The themes are: (A) reliable comparables; (B) quantifying and
allocating location specific advantages; and (C) identifying and valuing intangibles.
A. Reliable Comparables
Unlike Brazil, China recognizes that identifying comparable transactions is
central to the transfer pricing analysis.15 It also accepts that when there are no
comparable transactions, alternative comparisons can be made with unrelated companies
that perform similar functions, own similar assets, bear similar risks, and operate under
comparable circumstances16 provided adjustments are made to facilitate comparison.
14

The Chinese position is that a “key challenge” for a developing country is the lack
of reliable public information on comparables. As a result, “in practice,” foreign
companies routinely use comparable sets that are “dominated by companies in developed
countries, simply because there are usually a much larger number of public companies in
who is able to exert control over the board of directors is appointed by another party; or two
parties with more than half of their senior management personnel (including the members of the
board of directors and managers), or at least one senior member of the boards of directors who is
able to exert control over the board of directors is appointed by the same third party;
• Senior Management – More than half of one party’s senior management personnel (including the
members of the board of directors and managers) concurrently hold senior management positions
(including the members of the board of directors and managers) of another party, or at least one
senior member of the board of directors who is able to exert control over the board of directors
concurrently is a senior member of the board of directors of another party;
• Intangible assets controlled – One enterprise’s normal production and operation activities are
dependent on intangibles licensed from another enterprise (including industrial property rights or
patented technology);
• Purchase/ Sales controlled – Purchases or sales by one enterprise are under the control of another
enterprise;
• Services - One enterprise’s provision or receipt of services is primarily determined by another
enterprise; and
• Actual control – One enterprise has actual control over the other enterprise’s production,
operation, and trading activities through relationships associated with other interests (including
family relationships).
13
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.1.2.
14
Brazil uses annual averages, and prescribes fixed margins by statute rather than using comparable
transactions to determine gross margins and mark-ups. As Tatiana Falcao indicates:
The Brazilian transfer pricing system is unique in that Brazil has developed an objective
method that allows the taxpayer to mathematically determine and prove its pricing
benchmark without having to go through a search for comparables.
Tatiana Falcao, Brazil’s Approach to Transfer Pricing: A Viable Alternative to the Status Quo? 20 TAX
MANAGEMENT TRANSFER PRICING REPORT 20:1 (February 23, 2012).
15
OECD, Guidelines (2010) at ¶ 1.33; (1995) at ¶ 1.15. UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.2.1.
16
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.2.1. OECD, Guidelines (2010) at ¶¶ 1.35 & 1.36 (discussing
“appropriate adjustment to establish arm’s length conditions (or a range thereof)”).
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these countries”17. Using these companies is not a problem for Chinese tax authorities
but rather the problem is using them without applying appropriate adjustments. The
Chinese position is that when making these developed/ developing country comparisons
“significant comparability adjustments” are necessary.
The next point is critical. What happens if acceptable adjustments cannot be
made? Transfer pricing systems have answered this question in two ways:
•

•

If sufficiently acceptable comparables cannot be found, even after adjustments
have been made, then statistical methods can be used to smooth out the database
and derive a reasonable result, and
If sufficiently acceptable comparables cannot be found, even after adjustments
have been made, then there are no comparables. The arm’s length result must
therefore be determined with a method that does not rely on comparables and the
only method in that case is a profit-split.

US tax regulation champion the first position by allowing inexact comparables
since 199418. Statistical methods like an inter-quartile range are accepted as mechanisms
that improve accuracy. In 1995 the OECD Guidelines rejected this approach. The
OECD’s position was that inexact comparables that could not be effectively adjusted
were simply not comparable and there was nothing else that could be done19. Yet, in July
2010 the OECD changed its position so the OECD is now more closely aligned with the
US20.

17

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.2.2.
Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(B).
If there are no uncontrolled comparables described in paragraph (e)(2)(iii)(A) of this
section, the arm's length range is derived from the results of all the uncontrolled
comparables, selected pursuant to paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of this section, that achieve a
similar level of comparability and reliability. In such cases the reliability of the analysis
must be increased, where it is possible to do so, by adjusting the range through
application of a valid statistical method to the results of all of the uncontrolled
comparables so selected. The reliability of the analysis is increased when statistical
methods are used to establish a range of results in which the limits of the range will be
determined such that there is a 75 percent probability of a result falling above the lower
end of the range and a 75 percent probability of a result falling below the upper end of the
range. The interquartile range ordinarily provides an acceptable measure of this range;
however a different statistical method may be applied if it provides a more reliable
measure. (emphasis added)
19
OECD (1995) Guidelines ¶¶1.15 & 1.16.
In all cases adjustments must be made to account for differences between the controlled
and uncontrolled situations that would significantly affect the price charged or return
required by independent enterprises. Therefore, in no event can unadjusted industry
average returns themselves establish arm's length conditions. (emphasis added)
20
OECD (2010) Guidelines ¶¶1.33 & 1.35.
Where there are differences between the situations being compared that could materially
affect the comparison, comparability adjustments must be made, where possible, to
improve the reliability of the comparison. Therefore, in no event can unadjusted industry
average returns themselves establish arm’s length conditions. (emphasis added)
18
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What is the Chinese position? China follows the 1995 OECD position. China
prefers a profit split when comparables cannot be adequately adjusted. In the UN
Practical Manual China states that, “In some cases, it may require a different
methodology such as profit split as no sufficiently reliable comparability adjustment may
be feasible”21. China is not alone in this regard. New Zealand’s Inland Revenue holds
much the same opinion.
The best comparables are those that exhibit key economic characteristics
closest to the targeted company or transaction. Our policy guidelines
require the consistent use of one or more reliable comparables. "Industry
data dumps" are not acceptable, even if additional statistical analysis is
provided using various measures of central tendency (such as interquartile ranges, medians and averages). Statistical tools may to some
extent enhance the reliability of data carefully selected, but cannot
enhance inappropriately selected comparables. Regression analysis too, is
only as good as the robustness of the model employed, the underlying
assumptions and the data input22.
As a consequence, the Chinese position in the UN Practical Manual puts
exceptional pressure on a MNEs transfer pricing analysis. It is very likely that the
comparable profits (CPM)23 transfer pricing methodology will be adopted on the
transactions’ US side (for example) with a well-marked interquartile range spread over a
three year data period. The Chinese side for this same transaction may need to be a
profit-split24 so the tax outcomes for the same transaction may in fact differ.
Two issues are related under this heading. China objects to both using
unrestrained developed country comparables and to excessively using the transactional
net margin (TNMM) or in US terms the comparable profits (CPM) methods. These
issues will be considered separately for this paper although in the UN Practical Manual
they are frequently considered close together. For example, the China Chapter states:
One of the most common adjustments in China [presumably referencing
an adjustment made by the SAT] is accounting for differences in
geographic comparability when applying profit-based transfer pricing

21

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.2.3 (emphasis added).
New Zealand Inland Revenue, TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICE ISSUES, Comparables (December 1, 2010).
23
Treas. Reg. §1.482-5(e).
24
Consider Treas. Reg. §1.482-5(e)(Ex. 4) which uses a CPM to determines royalty amounts paid by a
wholly owned US manufacturing subsidiary in Foreign jurisdiction H, and where no comparable data is
found with any firms in foreign jurisdiction H, but where manufacturing entities in two other foreign
jurisdictions M and N are used in a CPM that uses three years of data to arrive at a statistical range. See
also Treas. Reg. §1.482-8(b)(Ex. 9) which compares the use of a CPM and a profit split in a fact pattern
where there are comparable foreign manufacturing firms in the same foreign jurisdiction, but consider the
possible alternate outcome if these comparables were not available, or were found in a different
jurisdiction.
22
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methods such as the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), to
determine an arm’s length price25.
(1) Developed country comparables
China argues that geographic adjustments are almost always needed when MNEs
propose using developed country comparables to determine a developing country arm’s
length price. Baker and McKenzie observes that this argument is based on countries like
Japan or Korea having low risk and low inflation rates and thus have lower overall
profit26.
The target for Chinese criticism is likely an example like that in Treasury
Regulation §1.482-5(e) Example 4 where a US high tech widgets developer manufactures
them through a wholly owned foreign subsidiary, earning a 5% royalty for its
manufacturing efforts. The finished product is then sold back to another US marketing
subsidiary at an arm’s length price. As a result, the transfer pricing question focuses on
the royalty.
If we assume that the manufacturer is located in China and the other two countries
involved are Japan and Korea, then the example is precisely on point with the Chinese
argument in the UN Practical Manual. Treasury Regulation §1.482-5(e) Example 4 at
(iii) could be re-drafted as follows:
Uncontrolled taxpayers performing similar functions cannot be found in
country H [China]. It is determined that data available in countries M
[Japan] and N [Korea] provides the best match of companies in a similar
market performing similar functions and bearing similar risks. Such data is
sufficiently complete to identify many of the material differences between
ManuCo and the uncontrolled comparables, and to make adjustments to
account for such differences. However, data is not sufficiently complete
so that it is likely that no material differences remain. In particular, the
differences in geographic markets might have materially affected the
results of the various companies27.
Even though material differences remain and even though these differences
appear to be attributable to differences in the geographic market, example 4 shows how
the US will proceed even with inexact comparables. Because the goods sold back to the
US Sub (MarkCo) are found to be arm’s length, the example assumes that the entire
reason for differences between the tested party (ManuCo) in foreign jurisdiction H and
the inexact comparables in foreign jurisdictions M and N is the royalty paid to the US
Parent28.
25

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.2.4.
Baker & McKenzie, Newsletter – Transfer Pricing (People’s Republic of China) January 2013 at 5. TAX
ANALYSTS (Document Service) Doc 2013-2280.
27
Treas. Reg. §1.482-5(e)(Ex. 4) at (iii) (emphasis added).
28
This is the same situation presented in two Australian cases where the transactional net margin method
was rejected by the court. In Roche Products Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) AATA 639
at ¶185, Judge Downes observes:
26
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The example shows that there are excess profits in foreign jurisdiction H [China]
and then concludes that these profits should be transferred back to the US Parent through
a royalty adjustment. The comparable profits method increases the royalty by the excess
three-year average profit [$21,500] over the forecasted 1996 profit based on the selected
PLI [Operating profit/ Operating Assets]. The PLI was derived from analyzing the
financial data from the inexact comparables.
A $21,500 royalty adjustment is made because the median operating profit should
be $3,750 based on applying the PLI while the actual operating profit in 1996 is $25,250.
Figure 1 presents Treas. Reg. §1.482-5(e) Example 4 in diagram form.

One of the problems of profit based methodology is that, when applied to transfer pricing,
it inevitably attributes any loss to the pricing. Where operating expenses are higher these
may place some of the emphasis of the cause of the loss on the wrong area. After all, it is
certainly true that there are companies, which make losses for reasons other than the
prices for which they acquire their stock. The Australian operations of multinational
companies are not necessarily excluded from this.
This is the precise turning point in another Australian case, where Judge Middleton similarly decided
against the Commissioner referencing the Roche decision, SNF (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Taxation 2010 FCA 635 at ¶131. See also: Michael Butler & Jessica Pengelly, Federal Court Rejects
Commissioner’s Attempt to Use Transactional Net Margin Method, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING
JOURNAL 43, 45-46 (January/February 2011).
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This example presents the Chinese case. China would prefer a different outcome
than the US regulations provide. The fact that many but not all material differences are
identified in this example suggests to a Chinese reader that a TNMM (or CPM) should
not be performed until those remaining material adjustments can be made. By identifying
Jurisdictions H, M, and N as China, Japan and Korea the Chinese concern in the
Practical Manual becomes clear.
The material differences in the example are differences in the geographic
markets, but now these different geographic markets can be seen as the Chinese see them.
These are differences between developed and developing countries.
China contends that the fundamental reason for unresolved material differences
has to do with the lower risks to doing business and the lower inflation rates in developed
countries. As a result, a royalty rate based on developed country markets is not
comparable to what should be paid by a Chinese firm. The Chinese royalty should be
considerably lower. In other words, at arm’s length a Chinese firm would demand higher
profits (through lower royalty payments), and if adjustments cannot be made to reflect
this, then a profit-split should be adopted.
(2) Transactional net margin method (TNMM/CPM) Overuse
Baker & McKenzie indicate that the TNMM or the comparable profits method
(CPM) is used in over 95% of all transfer pricing documentation prepared to date29. This
figure may be on the high side because other evidence suggests that the number is closer
to 50% for all company documentation in certain jurisdictions30. While there is nothing
wrong if the TNMM is applied accurately, the Chinese position is that this is generally
not the case so TNMMs should be used sparingly and instead a profit-split should
frequently be preferred.
When TNMMs are applied to a Chinese company, China insists that adjustments
are needed to both PLI valuations and to measure the domestic cost base. Two fact
patterns present these objections:
• developed country comparable adjustments – data drawn from developed country
comparables needs to be adjusted for geographic differences before it is used to
calculate the PLI that will measure the profitability of Chinese firms; and
• cost base adjustments – special adjustments are needed to account for location
specific advantages when a full cost mark-up (FCMU) is applied to a Chinese cost
base.
The first pattern was considered above while the second is considered below.
Both objections are variations on an overriding Chinese theme in the UN Practical
29

Baker & McKenzie, Newsletter – Transfer Pricing (People’s Republic of China) January 2013 at 5. TAX
ANALYSTS (Document Service) Doc 2013-2280.
30
India: CBDT Resisting TNMM, Pushing CUP Method, Demanding Affiliates’ Data, Practitioner Says, 13
TAX MANAGEMENT TRANSFER PRICING REPORT 627 (Oct. 13, 2004) (citing officials from the Central
Board of Direct Taxes that the TNMM was the most popular pricing method among Indian taxpayers,
approximating 50%, even though the CBDT prefers the CUP method).
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Manual, the OECD’s transfer pricing rules need to be applied more carefully to
developing countries. The most common context where cost base adjustments are needed
is in contract manufacturing.
Contract manufacturing is one of the most common forms of
manufacturing used by MNEs in China, particularly dealing with
manufacturing products for export. In evaluating a contract manufacturer's
return, the TNMM is often used as the transfer pricing method with the
FCMU being the most commonly used profit level indicator31.
The US argues against this position in the location savings example at Treasury
Regulation §1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(B). Here location savings from contract manufacturing
(garment sewing) in one low cost jurisdiction are transferred back to the parent company
because other buyers can secure similar low cost manufacturing services in a second and
a third jurisdiction.
A further example, Treasury Regulation §1.482-9(f)(3) Example 1 reinforces the
US opinion. Here related parties (parent and subsidiary) manufacture in different
jurisdictions. Additionally, the parent provides advertising services for the subsidiary. A
CPM is proposed because “… no data is available for comparable independent
manufacturing firms that render advertizing services to third parties … [but] … financial
data are available, however, for ten independent firms that render similar advertising
services as their principal business activity”32.
The PLI is operating profits in relation to total services cost or in China section of
the UN Practical Manual terms, a TNMM with a full cost mark-up. A cost-plus
methodology is rejected because it is not possible to “…determine whether these
comparable companies report costs for financial accounting purposes in the same manner
as the tested party…”33. The striking part of this example is that all ten comparable
companies are in a third jurisdiction.
The question presented concerns the arm’s length price for the advertising
services the parent’s employees rendered from parent company offices. Figure 2
diagrams this example:

31

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.5.5.
Treas. Reg. §1.482-9(f)(3)(Ex.1)(ii)
33
Treas. Reg. §1.482-9(f)(3)(Ex.1)(iii)
32
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If we add specificity to Treasury Regulation §1.482-9(f)(3) Example 1 we can
make it more realistic and relevant to this discussion. Suppose Country T is China and
Country Y is the US. Suppose further that Company B is the parent and Company A is
the subsidiary. We can then say that Company B in the US has set up a manufacturing
subsidiary in China to manufacture and sell one product line out of many manufactured in
the US.
In this context it would seem reasonable that the US parent would seek the
Chinese subsidiary’s assistance to help advertise all its products in the Chinese market.
Although it may have other advertising outlets in the US and elsewhere, the Chinese
market is considered culturally and linguistically unique (emphasis added). We
could further suppose that there is a long-term plan to transfer more manufacturing to
China if the Chinese market develops and proves receptive to all Company B’s products.
In this context, it would seem reasonable that public data on other local Chinese
manufacturers that advertise for their foreign parents would be hard to find. It might also
be hard to find public data on independent advertising firms in China. Where then do the
regulations’ authors believe the ten independent advertising firms are located? The
answer is most likely they are located in developed countries. If they are from Japan and
Korea, then from a Chinese perspective Treasury Regulation §1.482-9(f)(3) Example 1
replicates the problem from Treasury Regulation §1.482-5(e) Example 4.
Treasury Regulation §1.482-9(f)(3) Example 1, however, presents an additional
issue for China. This is a FCMU hypothetical and the cost base does not “… take into
11

consideration the location savings”34. Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(B) makes it
clear that the US will not attribute location savings to a service provider where similar
services at the same cost can be obtained elsewhere, albeit in developing countries.
As a result, the Chinese position is that a TNMM will routinely undervalue
returns if the PLI is largely derived from developed countries and the cost base is kept
low because there are similar cost structures in other developing countries. Furthermore,
if foreign providers cannot provide quality advertising services in China because China is
a unique market, there may be additional (intangible) “advantages” in having a subsidiary
assist with Chinese advertising.35 Figure 3 presents the modified Treasury Regulation
§1.482-9(f)(3) Example 1:

B. Location Specific Advantages (LSAs)
The Chinese position on location specific advantages (LSAs) is integral to the
Chinese position on TNMM’s excessive use and using developed country comparables.
Location specific advantages (LSAs) are found on the supply and demand side for many

34

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.8.
This intangible element was specifically removed from Treas. Reg. §1.482-9(f)(3)(Ex.1), but it seems
likely that factor would be present in a real world fact pattern.
35
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commercial relationships. They are commonly called “location savings”36 on the supply
side while referred to as “market premiums”37 on the demand side.
China makes a holistic argument for LSAs rather than a narrow argument for
location savings simply derived from low wages or inexpensive factory inputs. Three
LSA elements are considered:
•
•
•

LSAs are identified and computed on a net basis. Cost savings, revenue
increases, and additional expenses (dis-savings) need to be balanced.
LSAs need to be captured in economic profits. If LSAs are not passed on to
consumers in lower prices, then they are included in the Chinese profit profile.
Market power to capture profits is critical.
LSAs are allocated among related parties in the commercial chain. Because
LSAs exist due to market power, determining relative bargaining position is
critical to determining which party possesses the intangibles that enable market
power to be exercised38.

While the China Chapter in the UN Practical Manual considers four LSA
permutations in some detail, there are many more applications. The next four sections
consider R&D, toll manufacturers, brand-building distributors, and Chinese market
premiums.
(1) Cost-plus R&D markups
In this segment the China Chapter provides a numeric example the shows exactly
what is involved. An offshore affiliate secures contract R&D services from a Chinese
related party at a 50% cost differential. What would have cost 150 to perform overseas
can be done in China for 100. Rather than simply adding 50 to the Chinese cost base, the
China Chapter converts the cost differential into an adjustment to the FCMU derived
from a foreign developed country TNMM comparable. The result is rather than an 8%
FCMU on the adjusted cost base, the arm’s length result is determined with a 12%
FCMU on the actual cost base.

36

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.2.
Location savings are the net cost savings derived by a multinational company when it sets
up its operations in a low cost jurisdiction. Net cost savings are commonly realized
through lower expenditure on items such as raw materials, labor, rent, transportation and
infrastructure even though additional expenses ("dis-savings") may be incurred due to the
relocation, such as increased training costs in return for hiring less skilled labor.
37
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.2.
Market premium relates to the additional profit derived by a multinational company by
operating in a jurisdiction with unique qualities impacting on the sale and demand of a
service or product.
38
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.6. In the automotive industry China identifies a “market-fortechnology” industry policy that requires joint ventures for auto assembly in China, Chinese consumer
preference for imported brands, inelastic demand for vehicles in China, supply-side capacity constraints on
domestically supplied vehicles, duty savings on imported parts (10% rather than 25%), and a large supply
of high quality, low cost parts manufactured in China.
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China’s situation is in stark contrast to the US when it faced a very similar fact
pattern in Westreco v. Commissioner.39 Westreco provided contract research services for
its foreign parent Nestec and defended its pricing with four comparable US companies
that provided research and engineering consulting services as their core business
function40. Because good US comparables were found the case was resolved rather easily
and so would most Chinese cases if there were a sufficiently robust Chinese comparables
set. China’s argument in the UN Practical Manual is that the OECD needs to extend its
analytical materials so that developing countries lacking pubic databases can reach
reasonable arm’s length results41.
(2) Toll manufacturers converted to contract manufacturers
MNEs set up manufacturing subsidiaries that adopt contracting structures to
manage their tax profiles are called limited risk structures. Both toll and contract
manufacturing arrangements are used, but there are differences between them.
•

•

Toll or consignment manufacturing is an arrangement whereby the manufacturing
entity is paid a fee for services, normally determined on a cost-plus basis. The
applicable costs are labor and other direct costs involved in providing the service
but not the raw materials used to make the finished product. The cost of goods
and risk of loss for both materials and work-in-process never transfers to the toll
manufacturer.
Contract or turnkey manufacturing is an arrangement whereby the manufacturing
entity is paid a fee for finished goods. The manufacturer purchases raw materials,
frequently at a principal’s negotiated price with approved third-party suppliers.
The manufacturer incurs inventory costs and risk of loss. The client sells raw
materials to the manufacturer and completed goods are subsequently sold back to
them. A manufacturing services fee is incorporated into the cost of the finished
goods. The fee is commonly calculated in the same manner as the toll
manufacturing charge on a cost-plus basis.

While toll manufacturing is a common MNE structure in developing countries, it
causes problems for tax authorities because there are very few direct toll manufacturing
comparables and almost none have publicly available data. As a result the Chinese
observe that there are problems with getting an accurate PLI:
Some taxpayers simply use the FCMU for contract manufacturers as the
mark-up for toll manufacturers. This grossly underestimates the return to
toll manufacturers. Others use return on assets as a profit level indicator,
using contract manufacturers as comparables, and this may also
underestimate the return, particularly for toll manufacturers that are highly
labor intensive, as is often the case in developing countries42.
39

Westreco, T.C. Memo 1992-561
The companies are Arthur D. Little, Inc.; Artisan Industries, Inc.; Gulf Machinery Company, Inc.; and
Knechtel Research Sciences, Inc. (Id., at *18).
41
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶¶ 10.3.2.1 & 10.3.2.2.
42
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶¶ 10.3.5.8.
40
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The Chinese solution appears to be taken directly out of US case law, specifically
Compaq Computer Corporation v. Commissioner43. Much like the taxpayer in Compaq
convinced the court that it could adjust a US-based consignment manufacturing structure
to match a turnkey manufacturing structure in Singapore, the Chinese SAT has stated that
it will convert toll or consignment manufacturers to contract or turnkey manufacturers
whenever it finds them. It will then apply a contract manufacturer’s PLI to the adjusted
tax base44.
Compaq is an important case because the Tax Court accepts the taxpayer’s
comparables (in this case a CUP) even though the adjustments made are double the
amount of the underlying transactions themselves45. The IRS argued that the adjustments
were too extreme, stating that Compaq’s comparables were “… not based on actual
transactions and, therefore, [did] not satisfy the applicable regulations”46. Ultimately, the
IRS lost the argument, because the proposed comparables were accurately adjusted.
Compaq manufactured central processing units (CPU’s) for its personal
computers (PC’s) at its Houston, Texas, Compaq Asia (Pte) Ltd. Singapore, and Compaq
Computer Manufacturing Ltd. Scotland facilities. Among the materials required to
manufacture CPU’s were printed circuit assemblies (PCA’s), the electronic circuitry
inside a CPU that allows the PC to operate.
Compaq acquired PCA’s from three sources. Compaq (1) US manufactured some
PCA’s in Houston, (2) purchased PCA’s from Compaq Asia, its wholly owned turnkey
subsidiary in Singapore on a turnkey basis, and (3) purchased PCA’s on consignment
from several unrelated subcontractors located primarily in the US. Compaq Asia
provided half of Compaq’s PCA’s and the transfer pricing question concerned the
appropriate price that Compaq should pay for them.
The adjustment started with the consignment prices Compaq paid to unrelated
subcontractors which compensated them for labor, overhead, and a profit component for
both. Because the subcontractors were primarily US-based, this adjustment captured all
Compaq Asia’s labor and overhead savings along with standard materials costs plus a
materials mark-up. Using Compaq’s US standard materials costs, labor, and overhead
allowed Compaq Asia to retain all its’ Singapore location savings47. This is precisely
the result the SAT wants in China:
43

T.C. Memo 1999-220. For a detailed discussion of a Chinese audit of a MNE which converted a contract
manufacturer to a toll manufacturer. The audit resulted in an upward audit adjustment of CNY 733 million.
Jingyi Wang, Business Restructurings: A Case Analysis and Regulations Applicable to Business
Restructurings INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL 2013 20:5 (August 22 2013).
44
There are additional problems with the PLI itself if it has been derived from developed country
comparables, but that issue is not directly addressed in the Practical Manual in this section.
45
Between 1990 and 1993 Compaq purchased 3.6 million PCA’s from 14 unrelated subcontractors at an
aggregate price of $197,535,045 on a consignment basis. Adjustments of $399,576,598 were needed to
convert these transactions to turnkey equivalents.
46
Compaq v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-220 at *10.
47
The basic adjustment essentially eliminated most of the $232 million proposed deficiency.
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In practice, the Chinese tax administration has sought to first estimate the
total cost of the toll manufacturing operation as if it were a contract
manufacturer, usually by adding back the costs of raw materials, which
may be obtained from the customs administration. It then estimates the
appropriate returns (say, FCMU) for contract manufacturing based on
contract manufacturing comparables, and applies this to the estimated total
cost to arrive at the total contract manufacturing profit, from which it then
adjusts for factors such as inventory carrying costs, to arrive at the total
profit for the toll manufacturer.48
In Compaq the taxpayer set before the court two adjustment classes. These are
probably the same adjustment types that China anticipates performing on audit. First,
because Compaq Asia was a turnkey operation a basic adjustment converted the thirdparty PCA transaction consignment49 pricing structures to turnkey50 equivalents.
Secondly, seven additional adjustments were made to account for minor differences in
property or circumstances.
(3) Limited risk distributors and brand-building activities
It is not uncommon to find related distributors engaged in exceptional (extracontractual) brand-building activities. This is not just a Chinese or developing country
problem. The US has identified the same issue in both distributors and manufacturers.
Large markets like the US and strongly growing markets exacerbate this problem.
When a MNE has a subsidiary in a market that shows great promise, perhaps a market
like China or India with an expanding and affluent middle class, it does not matter if the
subsidiary is primarily a distributor or a manufacturer. In either case the MNE is tempted
to use its subsidiary’s local expertise for brand building. It is difficult to find a better
brand-builder than someone with product-specific knowledge and deep experience with
the local market.
This is the precise issue considered in Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C)
Example 351. In that example, a foreign wristwatch producer (FP) that is the global
registered trademark holder establishes a US distributor (US Sub). The distributor pays a
fixed price per wristwatch, and without separate compensation undertakes joint
48

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.5.9.
Compaq consigned raw materials and components to subcontractors, and the consignment price paid by
Compaq compensated the unrelated subcontractors for their labor and overhead costs plus a profit on the
labor and the overhead.
50
In the turnkey transactions the unrelated subcontractors purchased materials and components from
suppliers on the Compaq authorize vendor list (AVL) paying the same prices as Compaq. The turnkey
price paid by Compaq compensated unrelated subcontractors for materials, labor, and overhead as well as a
profit mark-up on each.
51
Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C)(Ex. 4) & (Ex. 5) present a similar fact pattern as Treas. Reg. §1.4821(d)(3)(ii)(C)(Ex. 3). The difference being that in (Ex. 4) and (Ex. 5) a formal contract modification occurs
in year 7, and the question is whether or not the modification is sufficient. In (Ex. 3) there is no prior
modification. The entire provision needs to be added, and the question is what should this provision be.
49
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marketing activities to establish FP’s trademark in the US. Unrelated foreign
trademarked wristwatches producers and their authorized United States distributors
undertake similar joint marketing activities in independent arrangements.
In years 1 through 6, however, US Sub does more. The example describes the US
Sub engaging in “… incremental marketing activities in addition to the activities similar
to those observed in the independent distribution transactions in the United States market
…[and for these incremental services it is also]…not directly or indirectly compensate”52.
In year 7, the FP’s wristwatches generate a premium return in the US in
comparison to wristwatches marketed by independent distributors. The example
therefore suggests, although there is no express statement to this effect that the premium
return is due to the US Sub’s incremental marketing activities. The transfer pricing issue
is narrowed to year 7 where substantially all the trademark’s premium return in the US
is attributed back to FP “… through an increase in the price paid per watch, or by some
other means”53.
Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C) Example 3 is narrowly focused on the
contract between FP and US Sub because the contract is missing something. The IRS has
the authority to impute terms when the parties’ course of conduct differs from economic
substance. The suggestion is that once the contract is modified to align with the parties
conduct, then the tax adjustment will not be hard to determine. In the US it is relatively
easy to find marketing agencies providing comparable services and publishing pricing
data. The return to the incremental marketing activities may be easy to calculate. In the
example it was stated that it was easy to find data on independent distributors engaging in
joint marketing activities.
The example suggests three contract modifications: a services agreement and two
intangible licensing agreements. They are (see figure 4):
• imputing a separate services agreement that affords US Sub contingent-payment
compensation for its incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 which
benefited FP by contributing to the FP’s trademark value;54
• imputing a long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit trademark in the United
States that allows US Sub to benefit from the incremental marketing activities it
performed; and
• requiring FP to compensate US Sub for terminating US Sub's imputed long-term,
exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States.

52

Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C)(Ex. 3) at (i).
Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C)(Ex. 3) at (ii).
54
See for example, Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 TC 172 (1985) (Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., a Swiss
corporation (Geigy-Basle), had established a U.S. subsidiary in 1908 to market and sell agricultural,
chemical, and pharmaceutical products in the United States (Ciba-U.S.). In 1951, Geigy-Basle initiated a
research project to develop new defoliants and herbicides. Geigy-Basle filed patent applications in more
than thirty-two localities, including the United States. Ciba-U.S. performed the work necessary to obtain
U.S. registration. The IRS asserted the development of a US intangible, but the court imputed a services
agreement.)
53
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The Chinese reaction to the MNE’s sales, marketing, and distribution functions is
the same as Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C) Example 3. China sees many
“limited risk distributors” in China where the MNE determines pricing by using “simple
distributor” comparables from mature markets.55 This is a variation of the developed
country comparables issue discussed above.56
China is prepared to reject these “so-called comparables”57 based on functional
differences and market differences evidencing that the fast-growing Chinese market is
not comparable to a mature market in a developed country. Based on this observation,
Japan-based comparables are specifically rejected. The litmus is comparing “median
operating expense to sales”58.
The Chinese SAT indicates two approaches: (1) rejecting the TNMM and
applying a profit-split method if “… significant local marketing intangibles or LSAs” are
identified; or (2) accepting the TNMM methodology but insisting on both a base
adjustment for location savings consistent with Compaq’s allocation to its Singapore
subsidiary,59 and a re-determining the FCMU ratio in line with the R&D discussion.60

55

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.5.10.
See text supra at n. 26 through n. 29.
57
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.5.10.
58
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶¶ 10.3.5.10 & 11.
59
See text supra at n. 41 through n. 50.
60
See text supra at n. 29 through n. 35.
56

18

Theoretically, China agrees with Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C)
Example 3 on how to solve this problem through either a services cost-plus approach or
an intangibles-based profit-split. Practically, China is at a disadvantage because it lacks
good domestic comparables.
(4) Market premiums reflected in Chinese profits
Market premiums are Location Specific Advantages (LSAs) on the demand side.
They are critical to understanding transfer pricing policy in China, India,61 and South
Africa62.
On the supply side the obvious LSAs are low wages and inexpensive raw
materials63. They fall neatly into the expression “location savings.” China would prefer
to treat these LSAs in the same manner as they were treated in Compaq. In other words,
they belong to China despite suggestions in Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(B)
that they should be realized outside of China64.
For LSAs on the demand side China makes a different argument. The scope of
this argument is not observed, much less replicated in any US regulations. China
understands the expression “market premiums” to include both: (1) the market itself that
pays a premium because of its size, scope and character and (2) product-based premiums
that are returned based on special characteristics of the product. The US understanding is
that element (2) is a market premium. There is no reference to market premiums as
described in (1) anywhere in the regulations65.
There are a number of examples in the regulations setting out the US concern with
a product that has special attributes and that will return a premium price. For example:
• Treasury Regulation §1.482-7(e)(2)(ii)(E) Example 6 concerning a premium price
reasonably anticipated from marketing a new pellet form fertilizer;
• Treasury Regulation §1.482-4(f)(2) Example 1 and Treasury Regulation §1.4824(c)(4) Example 4 concerning a premium price expected from marketing a new
headache medication (No split) that is superior to all other medications available
in the market;
• Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii) Examples 3 through 6 concerning the
premium price generated from marketing trademarked wristwatches; and

61

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶¶ 10.4.8.12 – 10/4.8.18.
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.5.4.3.
63
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.2.
Location savings are the net cost savings derived by a multinational company when it sets
up its operations in a low cost jurisdiction.
64
See supra at note 32 and following.
65
As a result the Chinese observe:
… it has been seen that certain issues such as location savings and market premium arise
more frequently in China and other developing economies, rather than in established and
developed economies (which comprise the bulk of the membership of the OECD).
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.1.
62
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•

The un-numbered example in Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(B)
concerning the premium price received from selling high fashion clothing
manufactured sewn in a developing country.

China’s perspective is different. The Practical Manual isolates the automobile
industry. China indicates that it has uncovered many other market premium examples in
other industries, but it is selecting this industry for the Practical Manual discussion66.
China notes:
• Global automotive companies set up joint ventures (JVs) in China to assemble
automobiles locally to be close to the market and the customers;67
• Chinese consumers have a general preference for foreign brands and imported
products, as opposed to specific brand loyalty and this creates opportunities for
MNEs to charge higher prices and earn additional profits on automotive products
sold in China68 and
• Huge, inelastic demand for automotive vehicles in China due to the large
population and its growing wealth.69
Without question China would prefer a Compaq solution where the entire
premium is allocated to China in all of these instances. These “… LSAs have led to
extraordinarily high profits that are rightly earned by Chinese taxpayers”70.
C. Valuing & Allocating Intangibles
The Chinese position on intangibles in the Practical Manual echoes developing
country positions because both developed and developing countries seek ways to tax
MNE’s income when it is improperly shifted to tax havens. China has taken a strong
position. It is willing to “look through” tax havens. It will require domestic consistency
in tax reporting if MNE’s apply for High and New Technology Status (HNTS).
The Practical Manual appears to be less harsh than previous Chinese positions.
The Practical Manual follows a value chain analysis that frequently leads to a profit split.
This analysis may be more popular in the EU than in the US. It is arguably consistent
with an OECD understanding of a commensurate with income (CWI) adjustment for
royalty payments.
(1) Tax haven entity IP ownership
China takes a strong position against MNEs that arranging their operations so that
IP is held in tax havens. In 2009 the shift of income to tax havens was addressed in
Circular 2 (the Enterprise Income Tax regulations). Circular 2 allowed the authorities to
ignore the location of the IP, and treat the Chinese entity as if no royalty was due.
66

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.4:
Market premium relates to the additional profit derived by a multinational company by
operating in a jurisdiction with unique qualities impacting on the sale and demand of a
service or product.
67
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.1.
68
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.6.
69
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.6.
70
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.3.6.
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The Practical Manual takes a more moderate approach. The contract R&D
discussion functions as a template for the broader discussion on how China will respond
when related party payments for IP are made to a tax haven resident. This is a value
chain analysis.
A value chain approach involves determining and MNE’s industry value drivers
or critical success factors71 as opposed to focusing on the controlled and uncontrolled
transactions’ assets, risks, and the economically significant activities72. Income and
related fees under a value chain analysis are determined through a fact-specific formula
that apportions based on the MNE’s internal data73. In other words, it is a profit split at
the MNE level. It rejects a cost-plus or TNMM/CPM approach to profit shifting74. The
entity owning the IP is less important than the development location of the IP.
Under Circular 2 the SAT will eliminate payments made for IP. The Chinese
entity is deemed to be the IP’s “holder” with royalties due to it based on related party IP
usage. Circular 2 states:
The tax authority may, from the taxation perspective, deny the existence
of enterprises without economic substance, particularly those which have
been established in tax havens and enable their related parties or nonrelated parties to avoid taxation.75
The Practical Manual is different. Under the Practical Manual the approach is to
determine the contract R&D entity’s value that it provides to overall group operations.
Compensation for this value contribution is not determined under the cost-plus or
TNMM/CPM methods but rather under a profit split approach. The objective is to
measure the Chinese R&D’s value as a contribution to the MNE’s overall profitability.
The Practical Manual states:

71

The initial studies in this area were by Pim Fris. See: Pim Fris, Dealing with Arm’s Length and
Comparability in the Years 2000, 10 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING JOURNAL 6 (2003) (but also
arguing that human resources and knowledge management are the most important intangible resources of a
MNE). Pim Fris & Sebastian Gonnet, ReAL Transfer Pricing: A New Paradigm for Transfer Pricing in
Europe? TAX PLANNING INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING (June 1, 2006).
72
OECD, Guidelines (2010) ¶ 1.20
73
This approach differs from the traditional functional analysis approach at its extreme, which leads to an
effort to seek remuneration for each function separately. Deloris Wright, an economist for the Australian
Tax Office in Roche Products PTY Limited v. Commissioner of Taxation, [2008] AATA 261 (April 2,
2008) at ¶¶ 117-123.
74
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.4.3; Markus Brem & Thomas Alexander Tucha, On Transfer Pricing:
Conceptual Thoughts on the Nature of the Multinational Firm (Working Paper W.P. 2005-11-03, Indian
Institute of Management, November 2005).
75
Circular Guoshuifa [2009] No. 2 (Circular 2), The Implementation Measures of Special Taxation
Adjustments, at Article 94. These are the basic regulations issued by the STA after the adoption of the
Corporate Income Tax Law, both of which were effective as of January 1m 2008. See generally: Cheng
Chi, Leonard Zhang, Gibson Ng & Kevin Zhu, China – Issue 1: General Transfer Pricing Framework,
BNA Transfer Pricing Forum (March 2013).
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Contract R&D is an area where the contribution of developing countries is
often underestimated. The transfer pricing method commonly used to
reward R&D activities performed by a subsidiary of a MNE in China is
the Cost Plus Method. Sometimes, it has been found that the principal
entity that is claimed to be responsible for the R&D has neither the
technical expertise nor the financial capacity to be responsible. In other
instances, the Chinese entity has obtained “high and new technology
status” in Chinese law and therefore enjoys tax incentives on the basis of
ownership of valuable core technology on the one hand. However, it also
claims to be a contract R&D service provider with no valuable intangibles
on the other hand. These are only a few examples where a cost plus
approach would not be adequate, and a different method such as Profit
Split Method would be more appropriate. It is expected that companies
claiming high tech status should be performing activities that result in the
creation of intellectual property of which they can claim economic or legal
ownership. It is not sufficient by itself that the contract R&D entity has
shifted the majority of its risks (e.g. unsuccessful research) to its
entrepreneurial related party. A proper analysis of the value provided by
the contract R&D entity to the overall group operations should be
conducted to determine the appropriate arm’s length return for the R&D
entity.76
Consider the following example drawn from Treasury Regulation §1.4827(j)(1)(ii) Example 2. The example highlights both the Chinese problem with the US
approach to this issue and how US-Chinese differences may end up producing conflicting
assessments.
In this example US Parent (USP) has two foreign subsidiaries (FS and R&D).
Both USP and FS manufacture and sell products and both will exploit the R&D
subsidiary’s newly developed IP. The R&D subsidiary has no exploitation rights.
The Regulation example explains that all three entities (USP, FS, and R&D) enter
into a cost sharing agreement (CSA) to develop manufacturing intangibles for a new
product line. The example’s purpose is to explain that even though R&D does the
research necessary for intangible development, because it cannot exploit the intangible it
cannot be a controlled participant (CP) in the CSA. R&D derives no reasonably
anticipated benefits (RAB) from exploiting cost shared intangibles. As a result, R&D is
deemed to be providing a service. Payment for the service is most likely determined on a
cost-plus basis, TNMM/CPM, and shared 33.3% and 66.6% with USP and FS
respectively based on their RAB. See Figure 5.

76

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.5.4 (emphasis added).
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If the Practical Manual’s China section was presented with the same fact pattern,
the US assessment would be replaced with a value chain analysis. The essential problem
for the Chinese is that there is a three-way organic relationship among USP, FS, and
R&D with each entity contributing to a single commercial outcome (selling “product A”
globally). As a result, a contribution analysis is preferable to a highly segmented
transactional analysis. To see how the re-configuration plays out, it helps to provide
specific jurisdictions in the example.
Assume that USP is a US entity, FS is an Indian subsidiary, and R&D is a
Chinese entity. For the Chinese, the 33.3% / 66.6% RAB division between USP and FS
is not as important as Product A’s global sales and its financial (profitability) projections.
The most critical issue is determining which entity is performing risk-averse routine
functions and which is performing high value non-routine tasks.
If the manufacturing and sales functions of USP and FS are mostly routine and if
R&D’s activities are mostly non-routine, then applying a residual profit split would
compensate the non-routine functions at a nominal (cost-plus) rate with residual profits
allocated to the R&D subsidiary. See Figure 6.
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Applying a value chain approach to Example 2 of Treasury Regulation §1.4827(j)(1)(ii) would maximize China’s return at the expense of the US and India. It
considers the MNE as a whole, making allocations according to the value contributed to
the entire enterprise. In Brem and Tucha’s analysis a CSA is a governance pattern (a
term Brem and Tucha use to describe an MNE’s internal organization structure that is
crafted to profit maximize). Governance patterns should not be ignored, and the profits
they realize should not be limited by RAB requirements. They explain:
We expect the next generation transfer pricing approach will – may have
to – make use of patterns of governance to characterize and to value the
functional contributions to the overall value chain. These governance
patterns are likely to serve for the design and/or establishment of arm’s
length behavior inside the MNE. Given the governance pattern of
(related-party) transactions, value chain analysis with risk-averse markups
on routine functions and residual profit split remuneration for non-routine
functions is likely to replace today’s bilateral transfer pricing approach77.
The CSA examples in the US Treasury Regulations are a very good place to look
for US-China differences. The CSA’s basic premise is that multiple related entities enter
into an agreement to develop intangible property for the entire MNE’s benefit rather than
a limited subset of entities within the entire enterprise78. The real intent of the CSA is not
to maximize profit in isolation. It is to maximize profits of the whole.
77

Markus Brem & Thomas Alexander Tucha, On Transfer Pricing: Conceptual Thoughts on the Nature of
the Multinational Firm 15 (Working Paper W.P. 2005-11-03, Indian Institute of Management, November
2005) (emphasis added).
78
In no example are we told that the entities presented are the entire MNE. The question of whether we are
looking at part or all of a MNE is irrelevant in the US regulations. An organic approach to transfer pricing
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For example, in Treasury Regulation §1.482-7(g)(6)(vi) Example 1, a CSA is
formed to develop very small data storage devices (nanodisks). A profit split is used to
determine the USP’s intangible contributions value to the foreign subsidiary’s profits
resulting from its research team and in-process software contribution. Of course there is
no conflict here if the foreign subsidiary is based in China because they are the only
MNE entities.
The next example, Treasury Regulation §1.482-7(g)(6)(vi) Example 2 involves
dual intangible contributions to developing a diesel-electric hybrid engine. Here the US
parent develops the engine technology and the foreign subsidiary develops the battery
technology. Once again a profit split is recommended.
If this example was drafted by the SAT, and if the subsidiary developing the
battery technology was Chinese, there would be no disagreement between US and
Chinese authorities on how to determine the transfer price. However, this will only be
true if no other entities within the larger MNE are involved with the diesel-hybrid engine.
If there were additional related parties involved, then the US focus on binary (parentsubsidiary) relationships will give a different answer than the Chinese. China casts a
wider net, and determines returns based on value-contributions to the whole business
structure engage in diesel-hybrid engines.
The same analysis applies to Treasury Regulation §1.482-7(i)(6)(vii) Example 1
where the US approach is to apply a profit split when a CSA is engaged in the
development of new cell phone technology.
In Treasury Regulation §1.482-7(i)(6)(vii) Example 3, US parent (USP) and three
separate foreign subsidiaries (FS1, FS2, and FS3) resident in three separate foreign
jurisdictions enter into a CSA. The mission is to develop version 2.0 of software that
USP developed originally.
In this case the regulations treat each USP-FS relationship separately. This is
inconsistent with the fact that the whole software development relationship is an organic
relationship among four related parties. If FS3 is a Chinese subsidiary, FS2 is Japanese
and FS3 is French, then the Chinese view would be that the Chinese contribution to
developing the newer software should be measured together with FS1, FS2, and USP’s
contribution. An aggregate allocation would be derived.
The profit-splits applied in Treasury Regulation §1.482-7(i)(6)(vii) Example 3 are
binary, not aggregate. This is problematical. The Chinese contribution to the MNE is
probably not binary, and the return that the Chinese entity deserves should be based on
the value it contributes to the whole enterprise79.
suggests that a benefit to any part of an MNE can have ripple effect throughout the organism, and that
internal (artificial) divisions are not appropriate.
79
Lee Sheppard reported on an August 27, 2013 OECD meeting at the Center for Tax Policy and
Administration that the Chinese position was explained:
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(2) Cost-plus method rejected for High and New Technology Enterprise status
(HNTE)
Chinese commercial incentives for High and New Technology Enterprises include
numerous special deductions and preferential tax rates for R&D activity. These
incentives impact the corporate income tax (CIT) via super deductions for R&D expenses
and reduced documentation requirements along with value added tax (VAT) exemptions.
The HNTE incentive program frequently requires the development of locally owned
intellectual property (IP). Provincial tax authorities grant HNTE status. It is valid for
three years and renewable at the tax authorities’ discretion. The CIT is reduced by this
regime from 25% to 15%80.
On January 13, 2013 the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of
Finance and the STA released a Notice of Inspections on High and New Technology
Enterprises Recognition and Administration81. The Notice indicates that the three
ministries would launch joint inspections. According to the National Audit Office Audit
Results Announcement [2009] No. 9 and Audit Results Announcement [2011] No. 34,
102 high-tech enterprises in total were disqualified as HNTE with tax deficiencies
exceeding 6.296 billion RMB during 2009 and 2010. Reportedly an addition 1,000
HNTE licenses have been cancelled in 2012.
The HNTE issue is the flip-side of the IP-in-tax-havens issue considered
previously. The Practical Manual’s concern in this instance is with inconsistent
reporting. The Practical Manual presents this issue as a warning to other developing
countries that provide similar high-technology incentives. The Practical Manual states:
In other instances, the Chinese entity has obtained “high and new
technology status” in Chinese law and therefore enjoys tax incentives on
the basis of ownership of valuable core technology on the one hand.
However, it also claims to be a contract R&D service provider with no
valuable intangibles on the other hand. These are only a few examples
where a cost plus approach would not be adequate, and a different method
such as Profit Split Method would be more appropriate. It is expected that
companies claiming high tech status should be performing activities that
result in the creation of intellectual property of which they can claim
economic or legal ownership82.
"Why are Chinese subsidiaries always routine? This question is always on my mind,"
said Wang Xiaoyue, director of the anti-avoidance division of the International Taxation
Department in China's State Administration of Taxation. She advocated a holistic view
of the value creation chain in a multinational operation.
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The OECD’s Special Measures, TAX ANALYSTS Doc 2013-20588 (2013
WTD 167-3) August 28, 2013.
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By the end of 2012 there were over 60,000 HNTEs with tax relief exceeding 600 billion RMB. Hwuason
Lawyers, Interpretations on New Policy for High-tech Enterprises: Circular Guo Ke Fa Huo [2012] No.
1220 (January 29, 2013) at ¶¶ I(A) &(B)
81
Circular Guo Ke Fa Huo No. 1220 [2012]
82
UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.5.4 (emphasis added).
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This is another instance where the Practical Manual advocates value chain
analysis and directs other developing countries to reject TNMMs, particularly those that
have FCMU PLIs.
(3) Royalty adjustments over time
The Chinese contribution to the Practical Manual adopts a limited commensurate
with income (CWI) rule. CWI stands for the principle that income derived from an
intangible (a royalty) should reflect the profits actually being earned through using the
intangible. CWI means that an initial royalty agreement should be adjustable on a
periodic basis to reflect actual returns. This is necessary because (a) contingent rather
than fixed royalty relationships are the modern norm, and (b) from a value chain
perspective, MNEs treat IP in a shared (dynamic) manner, not a static (or possessory)
manner.
The Practical Manual contains only a brief example. It states that royalty
amounts should be revisited so that a new measure of an intangible’s value can be taken.
Two aspects are considered. The first is the need to reduce royalty payments over
reasonable time periods when foreign parties are licensing IP to Chinese firms. The
second is the need to recognize that foreign licensing relationships frequently lead to
developing Chinese IP as the Chinese firm begins to work with and adapt the foreign IP
to local needs. This means that an additional royalty stream is created, one that runs back
to the Chinese firm. Foreign related parties will then compensate a Chinese entity as
benefits from the adaptation are realized. The Practical Manual states:
For example, if a Chinese affiliate was charged a 3 per cent royalty for the
use of a manufacturing process when the Chinese operations were
established ten years ago in 2002, then it may not be reasonable for the
Chinese affiliate to continue paying the same royalty in 2012 without
revisiting whether the intangible has continued to provide the same value
over time. This is particularly the case if the Chinese affiliate has
improved upon the manufacturing process provided by its parent
company, through a process of trial and error and conducting
manufacturing operations over a ten-year period. We would question
whether the Chinese affiliate should continue to pay a royalty to the parent
company for the manufacturing process, or whether the Chinese affiliates
should be entitled to a return on the intangibles that they have developed
and shared with the group companies83.
CWI is a US construction84. It is not adopted or codified anywhere else, other
than in Germany. CWI may be authorized under the Canadian Income Tax Act
subsection 247(2)(b) but this is not definitive. Based on the 33 branch reports to the 2007

83
84

UN, PRACTICAL MANUAL at ¶ 10.3.4.3 (emphasis added).
Commensurate with income was added to §482 in 1986.
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IFA Congress, only the Netherlands and Japan believe that they have the authority to
apply a CWI standard85.
Things have begun to change. In 1988 three examples were added to the OECD
Guidelines Chapter VI Annex. They illustrate a “way around” the ”problem” that the
OECD has with CWI. The answer is in payments clauses. By inserting a conditional
payment clause in a contract based on what parties would have agreed to at arm’s length
under the same circumstances the OECD gets around an otherwise “fixed royalty
agreement.” The Chinese position in the Practical Manual agrees with this approach.
A more direct OECD statement on CWI appears to be under consideration. The
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting action plan (BEPS) appears to be considering a
fuller CWI position86.
Case law does not support the theory underlying CWI. Prior to 1986, the year
that CWI was added to the Internal Revenue Code, only R. T. French considered the CWI
issue87. After 1986, only the Xilinx case has considered it.88 In both cases the court did
not view CWI favorably.
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Jens Wittendorff, TRANSFER PRICING AND THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010)
at 692-93. The essential problem with CWI (from an OECD perspective) is that Article 9(1) of the OECD
Model Tax treaty is an ex ante (before the event) arm’s length test. A transfer price needs to be
determined based on the information available at the time of the controlled transaction. [Guidelines at ¶¶
1.11, 1.30, 1.66, 2.11, 3.12, & 3.14.] Hindsight is not allowed. [Guidelines at ¶¶ 1.51, 3.14, 5.20, 6.32,
8.20, Annex to Ch. VI at ¶4, Annex to Ch. IV at ¶¶ 49 & 52.] Some practitioners see CWI as an ex post
application. This is what accounts for the limited adoption of CWI among OECD countries.
86
It appears that the OECD may be planning on developing a CWI standard for the OECD Guidelines as
part of the BEPS process. Craig A. Sharon, Questions and Concerns About the OECD’s Changing View of
the Arm’s-Length Standard, BNA TAX AND ACCOUNTING: BLOOMBERG BNA (September 26, 2013):
The proposal in the BEPS Action Plan to develop "special measures within and beyond"
the arm's-length standard in broadly applicable circumstances (Items 8-10) is a direct
admission that the OECD is looking, at least in part, outside the arm's-length standard to
change current transfer pricing outcomes. Such special measures would effectively
override the results of a core transfer pricing analysis, even an analysis compliant with
the new people functions test. Regardless, what are these special measures? Will such
measures apply only to income subject to limited or no taxation, the stated focus of the
BEPS project? More specifically, is the OECD talking about a global commensuratewith-income (CWI) test applicable to intangible and possibly other transactions …
OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013) at items 8 -10; Brett Weaver, Sean
Foley & Andrew Hickman, Global Tax Reform: OECD Efforts on BEPS and Transparency, 141 TAX
NOTES 318 (October 21, 2013).
87
R.T. French Company v. Commissioner, 60 TC 836 (1973) (concerning a US manufacturer of food
products that had licenses an instant mashed potato formula from a foreign corporation that was not a
related to at the time. The royalty was 3% of net sales. Unrelated parties paid 5%. After a restructuring
French became a related party with the licensor, and the IRS sought an adjustment. The court did not
revise the royalty, as it was arm’s length at creation, even though now it was between related parties.)
88
Xilinx v. Commissioner, 125 TC 37 (2005); 567 F.3d 482 (2009); 598 F.3d 1191 (2010) (Xilinx was in
the business of researching, developing, manufacturing, marketing, and selling programmable logic
devices, integrated circuits devices, and other development software systems. Xilinx and a subsidiary XI
entered into an agreement providing that all technology developed by either party would be jointly owned.
There was a cost allocation in the Xilinx Stock Option plan, and the Commissioner wanted to adjust it
(making that the stock option costs a shared cost between Xilinx and XI). The IRS argued that the
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The Chinese position in the Practical Manual goes further. Rather than engaging
in the ex ante/ ex post argument developed in the Annex of the OECD Guidelines, China
emphasizes a dynamic or developing IP approach. The Chinese argument is – there are
very few static, one-on-one IP relationships among entities of an MNE. An MNE’s IP is
almost always multi-entity development project and the rights are shared widely within
the MNE.
To paraphrase the Practical Manual, China believes that a new intangible is
created if a Chinese affiliate improves upon its parent company’s manufacturing process,
even if it is only through a trial and error process. Linear IP exchanges therefore quickly
become multi-directional. In other words, an initial IP exchange from a foreign parent to
a Chinese subsidiary can be expected to produce a derivative exchange that runs back to
the MNE. The MNE expects this development, and plans for it.
Not surprisingly, this countervailing IP argument finds support in the US
regulations. The regulations, however, present this problem in static (linear) manner.
The Chinese view disrupts static analysis. Consider, for example, Treasury Regulation
§1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C) Example 6 and Treasury Regulation §1.482-9(g)(2) Example 1
below.
(1) In Treasury Regulation §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C) Example 6, company X is a
MNE member in the pharmaceutical sector that undertakes R&D in years 1 through 4. It
results in the development of a compound that is more effective than existing medications
in treating certain conditions. In year 4 another company (Y) is acquired, and
immediately thereafter:
Company X makes available to Company Y a large amount of technical
data concerning the new compound, which Company Y uses to register
patent rights with respect to the compound in several jurisdictions, making
Company Y the legal owner of such patents. Company Y then enters into
licensing agreements with group members that afford Company Y 100%
of the premium return attributable to use of the intangible property by its
subsidiaries89.
Example 6 does not specify whether or not Company Y is US or foreign. This is
probably intentional. Company X is a US entity. A royalty is imputed from Y to X for
the IP. Figure 7 diagrams the regulation.

commensurate with income provision took precedence over the arm’s length standard in this case. The
court ultimately refused to adjust the contract to accord with what the IRS asserted was commensurate with
income payments.)
89
Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C)(Ex. 6) at (ii) (emphasis added).
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A small modification to example 6 allows it to be used to illustrate Chinese
concerns. Assume that the MNE has four entities: X, X1, X2, and X3. Assume further
that X is Chinese while X1, X2, and X3 are US entities. Then assume that X
manufactures pharmaceuticals for the Chinese market based on the IP secured from its
US Parent (X1) and that the Chinese affiliate (X) has developed through its own trial,
error, and experimentation with Chinese traditional medicines. This is the key discovery
(among many) that allows this compound to be a more effective medication than others in
the market. This R&D discovery occurs in years 1 through 4.
Continuing with example 6 we have Y acquired in year 4, but assume that Y is
located in a tax haven jurisdiction. If X makes available to Y significant technical data
concerning the manufacturing these new pharmaceuticals, and if Y uses this data to
register patent rights in Japan, the UK, Canada, and South Africa, then we have replicated
the example 6 fact pattern in a manner that highlights China’s concerns. China would be
losing royalties for Chinese developed IP. This concern is in addition to the US concern
that it is losing the income on the initial IP transfer. See Figure 8.
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In this modified example 6 the IP that is made available to Y is more than X1’s
base IP. X’s R&D enhancement (for which X deserved a royalty) is also transferred. In
effect the aggregate IP development efforts of the MNE has flowed through the entire
value chain. It culminated with Y’s patent registrations.
By making the fact pattern dynamic, rather than linear, it becomes apparent that
the only method that will allocate revenue properly over time is a residual profit split.
This is exactly what the Chinese contribution to the Practical Manual is suggesting.
(2) In Treasury Regulation §1.482-9(g)(2) Example 1, Company A in Country X
auctions spare parts with an interactive database. Company A’s employees manage the
database on servers located in Country X. Company A developed the software and
licenses it to its wholly owned subsidiary Company B located in Country Y. Company Y
replicates Company A’s business with spare part auctions in Country Y.
Subsequently, Company B designed specialized communications software that it
uses to connect its data center in Country Y with Company A’s data center in Country X.
Company B’s communications network also allows uncontrolled companies to access
Company A’s interactive database and purchase spare parts directly from Company A.
Company B performs marketing and advertising services to promote Company A’s
database. Company B finds buyers and finds listings for Company A.
The regulatory analysis indicates that there are dual valuable intangibles, and
there are “… no market comparables for the transactions between Company A and
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Company B to reliably evaluate them”90. Thus, a residual profit split is applied.
Allocations are first to routine contributions such as general sales, marketing, and
administrative functions with residual profits allocated based on the non-routine
contributions relative value. See figure 9 below.

China’s commentary in the Practical Manual suggests that a dynamic, rather than
a static analysis is preferable. Example 1 can be modified slightly to illustrate the
Chinese approach.
Assume that Country X is the US and Country Y is China. The first thing we see
is that A and B are independently engaged in online sales auctions using software
developed by Company A. A royalty payment from Company B flows back to Company
A. The reason for dual web sites is that Company B is a fully Chinese auction site that
targets customers locally. Company A’s site is in English and targets the US market. See
figure 10 below.

90

Treas. Reg. §1.482-9(g)(2)(Ex. 1) at (ii).
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The next step is to add in Company B’s software that links Company B and its
third-party customers with Company A’s data center. In the Practical Manual China is
concerned that Chinese software development is not identified and the countervailing
royalty from Company A back to Company B is not recognized. This is place where the
Chinese issue first comes to light, but it may not be were it began.
The Chinese approach is to strongly push for profit splits very early in the
analysis. China does not want to wait until a relationship is fully matured. This approach
is a nod in the direction of an understanding that early on in the process both A and B
understood that linking software would need to be developed by one or the other. A
profit split is preferred. See figure 11 below.

The only real difference here between the US and Chinese approach is that the US
regulation jumps immediately to the end step, identifies the dual intangibles, and applies
a residual profit-split. The US and China are commonly concerned. The US omits any
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discussion of the transitional events, and this is where China sees trouble beginning. As a
result, China almost always begins with a profit split where the US comes to it later.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese contribution to the UN Practical Manual is significant, both for
foreign businesses engaged in Chinese activities and for MNEs in general. It may well be
that the Chinese approach to transfer pricing will change the way cross-border problems
are analyzed globally. China’s influence at the OECD may soon rival that of the US.
The major UN/OECD issues involve:
1. Significant comparability adjustments are needed when comparable sets are
drawn from developed countries such as Japan, Korea, Australia and New
Zealand;
2. The transactional net margin (TNMM) method is considered overused and
inaccurate;
3. Location savings should be reflected in costs subject to a cost-plus mark-up for
research and development conducted in China;
4. Toll manufacturers will be converted into contract manufacturers with tightened
rules such as cost of materials add-back; rejection of return-on-assets analysis;
5. Limited risk distributor status is denied for brand building distributors (those that
have significant advertising, marketing, and promotion activities);
6. Market premiums are to be reflected in Chinese profits;
7. Tax haven based ownership of IP can be “looked through” or denied;
8. A cost-plus methodology is rejected whenever a Chinese related party qualifies as
an intangible developer under “high and new technology status” (HNTS) and
profit splits should be contemplated; and
9. Royalty adjustments need to be made over time in a commensurate with income
manner (CWI).
Each of these issues is addressed, although somewhat cryptically in the Practical
Manual, and it will be important to see the details in an official Circular. That
development is expected shortly.

34

